This week I attended the Conference on Moderation in London, which the Kuwaiti Ministry of Endowments and the International Center of Moderation in Kuwait had called. The conference was distinguished by its participants who had a variety of geographical and intellectual backgrounds as they came from different centres and associations in Eastern and Western Europe.

The goal was to study the Muslims’ cultural situation in the light of the principle of moderation that should govern Muslim’s life away from extremism and dissoluteness.

One of the aspects that were discussed was the foundations of the fiqh of Muslim minorities. This kind of fiqh is denied by some people while others take it beyond its limits. Thus, this is a field in which to seek moderation as it needs to establish its foundations. The foundations of the fiqh of Muslim minorities can be divided into objectives and rules.

The objectives are:

First, a general objective, which is to preserve the religious life of the Muslim minority on both individual and community levels.

Second, spreading Islam among the majority of the population. This in turn will lead to establishing Islam on the ground.

Third, establishing the basis of the relation with the other amid the cultural and international status quo in order to find a state of mutual trust and acceptance, a matter which may not be confined to the case of Muslim minorities due to the international situation.

Fourth, establishing the communal fiqh in the life of Muslim minorities; that is, moving from individuality to collectivity.

As for the rules, this does not mean to reinvent new jurisprudential or juristic rules. This means rather to focus while searching on the rules existing in our jurisprudential and juristic heritage which are closer to the status quo of the minorities so as to re-examine it and to discover the possibilities of dealing with the situations of the minorities.

Like other branches of fiqh, the fiqh of Muslim minorities refers to the two sources of shari`ah; namely, the Quran and the Sunnah. But with regard to the details, it refers to the universals of the shari`ah that require removing hardship, applying the rulings of necessity, taking into consideration the widespread cases in both acts of worship and transactions, considering the change of place equal to the change of time, warding off evils, inclining to the lesser of two evils – which some people call the fiqh of balancing – and the consideration of the considerable public interests not the inconsiderable one.

“The shari`ah is based on wisdom and on achieving people’s interests in this world and in the hereafter”, as ibn al-Qayyim said in I`lam al-Muwaqqi`een.

The shari`ah has attested to the genus of these universal principles in innumerable texts.

Second, the fiqh of Muslim minorities refers to particular texts that apply to issues found in the countries of minorities and shared by the Muslim majorities.

Third, the fiqh of Muslim minorities refers to a particular principle adopted by some scholars who consider the situation of Muslims who live in non-Muslim lands as a reason to drop some of the shari`ah rulings. This is known as the issue of “the abode”, which we call “the ruling of the place”. This position is reported on the authority Amr ibn al-`Ass, a Companion of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), and on the authority of some scholars such as al-Nakh`iy, al-Thawry, Abu Hanifah, Muhammad, Ahmad, according to one narration, and `Abd al-Malik ibn Habeeb, a Malikite scholar.

This is based on some ahadith such as the prohibition of executing penalties on non-Muslim lands. Abu Dawoud, al-Termidhy, and Ahmad reported with a strong chain of narrators “Hands shall not be cut off while being in a state of travelling.”

Based on these principles, on universal and particular evidences, and on the opinions of the people of knowledge, ijtihad seeks to give preponderance either on selective or innovative basis. Personally I prefer the first kind and dare not adopt the second except on the basis of ramifying from a previous scholarly opinion; because in the first kind one chooses from among the opinions of the scholars to achieve an interest that requires this choice or to keep away an evil that may result from the application of the other abandoned opinion.

To be more precise, ijtihad here has three kinds: new ijtihad in order to bring about new opinion concerning new issues by using the process of analogy with the rulings stated in the Quran and the Sunnah. There is also ijtihad that is concerned with the proper application of ruling to the case. This kind of ijtihad never ceases, as al-Shatibiy said, because it is concerned with the application of an agreed upon rule to a new status quo. This kind is not like the first one which only the mujtahidun (practitioners of ijtihad) can assume. Rather, both the mujtahid and the muqalled (imitator) are equal in this regard.

As for the third kind, it is ijtihad to give preponderance to one juristic position. This position could be non-preponderant at some time due to the weakness, not the nonexistence, of its bases. Thus, scholars choose it for an interest that requires this choice. This is what is called by the Malikites as “the running practice”.

Thus, handling these three kinds of ijtihad should be in the light of the three aspects that govern the process of fatwa; namely, the status quo of the Muslim minorities, the universal evidence, and the particular evidence.

From all this, the fatwa comes up amid dialectic, interrelations, integration, and interaction that result in balancing between the evidence and the status quo that enables the jurist to regulate the fatwa and see the ruling through the rank of need, the rank of evidence, and the rank of issuing the ruling and also through balancing between the universal and the particular. This is a subtle sort of treatment where neither of them could be neglected. Rather, each of them should be duly considered when forming the ruling. Therefore, the Malikites have set what they called “the intermediary rule” according to which when there is one issue that has two aspects, two different rulings should be given due the presence of two pieces of evidence.

You will see these kinds of ijtihad through observing the situation of Muslim minorities with regard to their marriages, financial transactions, food and clothes habits, dealing with people, offering congratulations in times of joy and condolences in times sadness, participating in political parties, nominations, elections, etc.

Muslim minorities face stubborn challenges on the level of the individual who lives in an environment which has its material philosophy where there is no room for religious motives and on the level of the family that attempts to keep together in a society where familial ties have broken and the relation between the two spouses and between the parents and their children has no longer become founded on positive guardianship. As for the level of the minor Muslim community that dwells among these societies, they are scattered, unregulated, and uncollected. The challenges face also the creed in the sense of being a Muslim who believes in Allah, His Angels, His Books, and His Messengers, whether according to the methodology of the Ash`arites, the Salafites, the Mu`tazilites or the like methods of interpretations that confuse laypeople.

Perhaps the article of faith written by Muhammad ibn Abu Zayd al-Qayrawaniy in the introduction of his treatise, which has reference in the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah that are beyond controversy, is the best thing Muslims should learn in the lands to which they migrated owing to its simplicity and its being free from argumentation and confusion.

This also applies to acts of worship that require the formation of Muslim groups and Islamic institutions such as mosques, schools, and centres. This also applies to the relation with the other and how to find means of coexistence that keep the Muslim away from melting away in the other culture and at the same time safeguard him against isolation and seclusion to be an active member in the society following the suit of Joseph the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) when he said to Egypt’s king “Appoint me over the treasures of the land. I am a good keeper and knowledgeable.”

All this needs a juristic aptitude to balance between the evidence and the status quo with piety that is free from hesitation and brevity that is free from boldness.

When discussing the meaning, role, and limits of reason, it is important to highlight a major, long-standing issue related to both religion and reason: the issue of Divine Will, good and evil, and Divine Nature. In this series of articles, we will discuss such aspects in some detail.

This is a philosophical and metaphysical issue that cannot be measured quantitatively. Of course, a believer in heavenly revelation and Prophethood differs with others on the perspective to it. All believers in heavenly messages believe in a realm that is beyond rational categorization but is recognized as inevitable in light of the fact of existence. This is the Inevitably Existent, of Whom everything is in need but Who is in need of nothing. This is the Everlasting Who, for us Muslims, cannot be subject to the laws governing created beings, as such laws are not a valid basis for comparison due to dissimilarity, let alone similarity. This is the meaning of: {And He has no match whatsoever}. The scope of reason here is limited to impossibility and inevitability: It is impossible that the universe exists without Him, and it is inevitable that He exists.

Existing creatures were originally nonexistent, and the coming of the nonexistent into existence logically entails an originator. In addition, engineering creatures so delicately and orderly requires that such originator is all-wise, all-able, and all-cognizant. This is the inevitable conclusion of sound minds that understand that nonexistence cannot originate existence, that haphazardness cannot originate orderliness, and that coincidence cannot originate delicate engineering. Allah says, {Or were they created by nothing or were they themselves the creators?} The attributes of that originator must be attributes of perfection, which belong to the sphere of inevitability, while their contraries belong to the sphere of impossibility. But heavenly revelation intervenes here to prove or deny what is established or denied by the mind.

Therefore, contradiction is inconceivable between the mind and heavenly revelation. Imam As-Sayrafi, a prominent Shafi`i scholar, said, “It cannot happen that the Book, Sunnah, or Muslim consensus come with something unacceptable to the mind. With this in mind, every act of worship stated in the Qur’an or Sunnah either (1) seconds the approval or disapproval by the mind (such as requiring thankfulness to Allah and prohibiting polytheism) or (2) brings forward something that is mentally neutral (such as Prayer and Zakah, which turned, by virtue of divine texts, from fifty-fifty possibility into utter obligation). Religious texts fall only under one of these two categories. The evidence that the mind can judge what is received through religious teachings is that it is authorized and assigned to distinguish between things”.

As we can see, there is no disagreement among scholars, whether rationally or religiously, ascribing all attributes of perfection to Allah, the One and Only. All His Acts and Commandments are an embodiment of truth, goodness, and beauty. Al-Amidi said, “There is an agreement that all Acts of Allah are good in every way and that all their contraries — untruth, evil, and ugliness — can never be His”.

What is the meaning of good and evil? And what are their features?

Good and evil are abstract, indefinite words. Good is whatever conforms to an ideal or moral though, virtue, justice, or interest; evil is the opposite of all such.

Can a universal phenomenon be described as good or evil in any way? And relatively to what? Here, perplexity arises among those who lack insight. We will try to illustrate the concept of good and evil with some examples — though each has its own particularity.

A farmer is burning the weeds in his field or slaughtering the diseased cattle. How do you see this? Contrarily, a vandal is burning others’ gardens or killing their animals — {Destroys crops and cattle} in the Qur’anic wording. How do you see this? The same act takes different responses depending on the intention and the doer.

Other examples include a doctor who cuts the skin of a patient in a surgery to save his life, compared to a criminal who injures someone deeply, or a judge who sentences a criminal to imprisonment or death to protect society against his malice, versus a tyrant who kills people with fighters and missiles. It depends on the motive and aim of killing, but it depends also on our perception of good and evil. In the next article, we will continue to discuss the criteria for good and evil as held by Muslim scholars as well as others.

Amid such heated argument about rationalism and reason, with some for, some against, and some criticizing Muslim lack of it (as seen in the last speech of the Pope), it is relevant to have a look at such concepts in terms of their meaning, importance, and limits.

In the Western perception, reason (from Old French raison, from Latin ratio) can simply be defined as a “human capacity for logical, rational, and analytic thought”. It is the tool that directs the “inner world”, turns feelings into decisions, and motivates action. It is a body of principles and ways of thinking that enable good judgment on things. It is abstract (just like good and evil), not material or sensible (such as blackness, dates, wheat, etc.).

Meanwhile, rationalism is “any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification”. Some Western philosophers hold that reason or the mind is independent of experience, whether absolute, as maintained by Descartes (adopting a Platonic perspective), or critical, as proposed by Kant. Rationalism opposes eighteenth-century British empiricism, with primary exponents like John Locke and Hume.

As back as the second century A.H. (eighth century A.D.), Muslim thinkers tried to resolve such dichotomy between reason and rationalism, but often to no avail. Ash-Shafi`i defined reason as the “capacity to distinguish things from their opposites”. Others said, “Reason is an instinct that is subject to humanities”. Al-Amidi said, “It is all the necessary knowledge that cannot be absent in any human when physically mature, sound, and free from the contraries”. This is the same view of Descartes.

According to Al-Ghazali, reason is instinctive and necessary and is classified into theoretical and empirical. Is reason the same for all people and unvarying from one person/nation to another?

‘Yes’ was the answer given to the above question by Ar-Razi, Ibn Al-Qushayri, and others, including Descartes, who held that “good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed”. Some, on the other hand, deemed reason empirical and interpersonally varying. Reconciliation could be made between the two sides, identifying two types of the so-called reason, instinctive and empirical, regardless of real or figurative usage, on the grounds that reason and good sense increase and decrease depending on experiences.

Does the mind have limits?

Some Western philosophers view that the mind have no limits, and some go far to claim that the mind has only the limits that it makes for itself or that all that can be perceived is within the limits of the mind. In his remarkable work Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discussed in detail the scope and limits of reason.

By contrast, some admitted that the human intellect is limited by its physical and social surroundings, which impose on it constraints that show its limitation. Perhaps this is what the contemporary Moroccan philosopher Taha Abdurrahman meant by warning against reason by reason for reason. For us Muslims and all believers in a heavenly message, reason has a ceiling or utmost point, which is where the sphere of heavenly revelation exists as a metaphysical realm beyond the perception of the human mind. Yet, the mind deals with this sphere in terms of mental impossibility, possibility, and inevitability. As Muslims, we believe that scope cannot involve contradiction. What is deemed impossible by reason cannot be deemed possible by heavenly revelation, and what is deemed inevitable by reason must be deemed so by heavenly revelation.

The possible can be approved or denied by heavenly revelation, where the latter makes judgments without objection by reason, which has to do with impossibility and inevitability but submits to heavenly revelation in connection with possibility. This applies to the field of Creed, where reason is a generative source or determinant. In Shari`ah, however, two spheres must be identified. The first is dealings, which are based on people’s interests and where reason goes side by side with heavenly revelation. Scholars differed on this integration: Some saw that if Shari`ah is established on a specific case, it has precedence over people’s interests necessitated by reason; others viewed that Shari`ah authorizes the mind to use interests as a basis for legislation. But there is a general agreement that reason remains an indispensable exploring tool.

The second sphere is acts of worship, which basically come from heavenly revelation and are beyond the scope of the mind. Still, as Al-Fihri said, such acts of worship are rational in general, even if not comprehensible in details, such as Prayer, etc.

In this article, we will continue to discuss the limits of freedom of expression, philosophy of freedom, and impact of freedom on promoting or undermining inter-civilization dialogue, which was partly referred to in our discussion of the notion of a universal system of freedoms for all humanity.

Generally speaking, freedom cannot be absolute, or otherwise it would lead to chaos in every way. So, there is a need for what is called “public order”, which serves as (1) a tool to regulate freedoms, (2) a criterion for capacity of intervention by official authorities, and (3) a means of control by the regulatory body.

Public order varies depending on the culture, interests, and morality of each nation. Naturally, public order in Islam is quite different from that in the Western civilization.

To illustrate, let’s take an example: In 1996, UK authorities refused to grant distribution certificate in respect of a video work that was considered contemptuous of Christ, which would outrage the feelings of Christians and disturb public order. The producer of the video recording lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a violation of his right to freedom of expression. On 25 November, 1996, the Court pronounced its judgment on the case (widely known as “Wingrove v. the United Kingdom”), upholding the restriction on the film because it was found blasphemous.

On the other hand, the Court upheld the ban by Turkish authorities of the Refah (Welfare) Party, stating in the preamble that the party adopted Islamic Shari`ah, which was incompatible with the European value system — or, let’s say, “the Western public order”.

Here, we have two cases: In one case, the Court respected the Western value system, in which Christ is regarded as sacred; so, restriction of freedom of expression was a legitimate measure against whatever abuses such sacredness, in view of the principle of public order. But in the other case, Islamic Shari`ah was not regarded as sacred under the same Western values; so, freedom of expression should be restricted for its advocates.

The same discrimination was stark in the response of many public figures in the West to the notorious cartoons mocking Prophet Muhammad.

That is the logic of Western public order. It is not our concern here to debate with Westerners or prove their paradoxical position resulting from intolerance and a sense of superiority. We take their position as consistent with their personal views and convictions. But they should respect others, and if they exercise their right to act upon their public order, they should at least recognize others’ right to exercise the same principle and ultimately recognize relativity in public order. Each nation has its own public order and value system.

As Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates restricting the freedoms set forth in the Declaration when in conflict with public order, which differs from one environment or culture to another, this can be considered an implicit recognition of the impact of cultural diversity on human rights.

There are differences in family laws, transactions, criminalization of certain acts etc., based on the differences in values.

Recognizing differences makes factions feel the significance and meaningfulness of dialogue and shows that it is not a matter of overpowering others by denying them their natural right to be different and requiring them to identify with you as a prerequisite for communication and interaction.

The key to successful communication is to accept one another as is, not as wished.

In the end of this discussion, I cite a Western philosopher who best depicted the relativity and environment-dependent nature of values. In his work Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead wrote, “The details of these moral codes are relative to the social circumstances of the immediate environment — life at a certain date on ‘the fertile fringe of the Arabian Desert, on the lower slopes of the Himalayan Mountains, on the plains of China, on the plains of India, or on the delta of some great river.

Again, the meaning of the critical terms is shifting and ambiguous — for example, the notions of ownership, family, marriage, murder, God. Conduct that in one environment and at one stage produces its measures of harmonious satisfaction, in other surroundings at another stage is destructively degrading. Each society has its own type of perfection, and puts up with certain blots, at that stage inevitable.

Thus, the notion that there are certain regulative notions, sufficiently precise to prescribe details of conduct, for all reasonable beings on Earth, in every planet, and in every star-system, is at once to be put aside. That is the notion of the one type of perfection at which the universe aims” (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, translated by Anis Hassan Zaki, p. 439).

In the previous article, we discussed some illusions among Westerners about the personality of our noble Messenger and about the teachings and perceptions of our great religion. In this article, we continue to discuss and refute misconceptions about and accusations laid against Islam.

I. Embracing Islam under Compulsion

It is relevant to highlight the fact that embracing Islam under compulsion is unacceptable. Islamic Shari`ah is all based on free choice, and when free choice is lacking, one’s conducts shall have no effect, whether in beliefs, contracts, commitments, etc. This is substantiated in numerous texts in the Glorious Qur’an and Prophetic hadiths.

Allah says, {There shall be no compulsion in religion}. This is a self-evident verse from Surah Al-Baqarah, which was sent down in Media, where Muslims were gaining more and more power — contrary to the Pope’s claim that it was sent down when Muslims were weak. It is a regretful, ill-founded claim. The truth is, a number of youths from Al-Ansar (Medinan supporters of the Prophet) were raised among Jews, and their families wanted to force them to embrace their religion. Then, Allah forbade them, asserting the rule of noncompulsion.

Also, in Surah Yunus, Allah says, {Had your Lord so willed, all who are on the earth would have believed altogether. Will you, then, (be the one to) compel people so that they become believers?} He also says, in Surah Al-Kahf, {And say, “The truth is from your Lord. So, whoever wills let him believe. And whoever wills let him disbelieve}. And in Surah Al-Ghashiyah, Allah says, {So, remind (people). You are but a reminder. You are not over them domineering}.

Similarly, when someone renounces Islam due to coercion, this renunciation shall have no effect. Allah says, {Except for one who has been compelled (to renounce his faith) while his heart remains at peace with faith} [Surah An-Nahl].

In Islamic jurisprudence, coercion is an unreasonable influence that renders contracts and commitments made thereunder null and void. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was reported to have said, “Allah has pardoned my Ummah for mistakes, forgetfulness, and that which they are forced to do”.

II. Concept of Jihad

Jihad is a beautiful concept that has been misused, whether by extremist adherence or by utter negligence.

What does jihad mean linguistically and technically? And why is it legislated in the Qur’an?

In Arabic usage, jihad is the “exertion of the utmost effort to achieve something that is probably desirable”.

Religiously, jihad has three types, as identified by Ar-Raghib in Al-Mufradat (The Items): (1) jihad against an express enemy, (2) jihad against Satan, and (3) jihad against one’s own self.

The last two meanings are stated in several hadiths. For example, Imam Ahmad in his Musnadand Abu Dawud in his Sunan reported Fudalah Ibn `Ubayd as narrating that the Prophet said,“A true mujahid is the one who strives against his own self in obedience to Allah, the Almighty”.

In a weak hadith reported by Al-Bayhaqi, Jabir narrated that, upon return from his last conquest Tabuk, the Prophet said, “We have returned from the minor jihad to the major jihad”. He interpreted it as meaning to combat one’s whims.

In fact, taking care of one’s parents is a sort of jihad. The Prophet said, “Then let your taking care of them be your jihad”.

Ibn Taymiyyah defined jihad saying, “It encompasses all sorts of worship, whether inward or outward, including love of Allah, devotion to Him, reliance on Him, submission of one’s soul and property to Him, patience, asceticism, and continuing remembrance of Him. It takes all possible forms — physical, spiritual, mental, verbal, etc.”

The first meaning, jihad or fighting against hostile non-Muslims, is the most common. Many Qur’anic verses and Prophetic hadiths detailed its merits, conditions, and guidelines. History reveals significant instances and practices of it between Muslims and non-Muslims, which have ever been an object of large-scale attention and heated debate, wavering between glorification and condemnation, overenthusiasm and neglect. How many people justify aggression and colonialism on the pretext of jihad or holy war! And how many people desert jihad and shrink from resisting the enemies, leading to catastrophic consequences! And how many movements and groups do not comply with the limits and rules of jihad, to the detriment of the image of Islam and Muslims! And how many anti-Islam opponents who contend that Islamic jihad is unjustifiable and is motivated by a blind desire to fight against non-Muslims, as Murad Hofmann quotes Father Hans Kung as saying. This is just one of many false accusations contained in orientalist writings to justify aggressive wars against Muslims, on the grounds of making Muslims civilized and peaceful.

Jihad in Islam is not necessarily synonymous to fighting; it has a much broader sense. Basically, it means to preach and defend what is right. In Surah Al-Furqan, Allah says, {And strive against them (i.e., advocates of falsehood) by means of it (i.e., the Qur’an), with the utmost strife}. That is, refute false claims with every possible evidence. Obviously, recitation of the Qur’an has nothing to do with military actions. Therefore, not every jihad should be fighting, and not every fighting should be jihad. In its essence, jihad is a call for freedom.

Not every jihad is a military action, nor is every military action jihad. Ibn Khaldun divided warfare into four types, depending on the motive. He wrote, “The origin of all wars is revengefulness. Two wars are unjust: war of expansion and war of aggression. And two wars are just: war in defence of religion (jihad) and war against rebels (sovereignty protection war, as he called it).

In the next article, we will discuss illusions and fallacies about the concept of and ruling on jihad in Islam.